The use of the terms 'disease' and 'diseases' has come under increasing scrutiny in recent years, in response to the need to define terms precisely and overtly in the field of computer-aided diagnosis, and to criticism of the 'medical model' of disease in psychiatry by some clinical psychologists, and by so-called anti-psychiatrists. This debate was highlighted when Kennedy (i) chose to start 'unmasking medicine' by a consideration of the terms 'illness' and 'disease'.
He considered the two terms separately, in the former stressing the evaluative nature of the notion of ill-health, and in the latter pointing to some weaknesses he saw in the 'mechanical' analogies of disease. He did not however attempt to examine closely the relationship between the sociallyconditioned value judgments involved in decisions about illness, and the technical distinctions made between different diseases, nor how the disease theory he criticises can be improved to overcome some of the weaknesses of which he accuses it.
An important contribution to this discussion was the definition of disease proposed by Scadding (3) , and revised by Campbell, Scadding and Roberts (2) . In the latter paper, and the correspondence which followed it, it became yet more apparent that clear ideas on these terms basic to Biological disadvantage and abnormality A second problem with their definitions is the use of the term 'biological advantage'. The problems arising from this term have been raised before (6), (7) . While at first sight it seems an adequate criterion, attempts to apply it rigorously (8) This is not to say that doctors should only concern themselves with analysis in these terms, an approach which Kennedy (I) criticises; good medicine will not lose sight of the person in the analysis of the problem, and will recognise the need for help with other aspects from relatives, friends, nurses, social workers etc., and not forget the patient's own contribution. Nevertheless in this role the doctor is acting as a sympathetic human being, albeit one who is professionally sympathetic, rather than exercising his professional skill, and the concepts of disease are a tool for the use of that skill.
Considering the first two questions separately makes it much simpler to consider the nature of the categories used by doctors to organise data (symptoms, signs, investigation results, etc) into patterns which recur and so enable past experience to be used in future judgments.
Nosological category To avoid confusion, the term nosological category is suggested for these concepts, since they are, literally, categories used in the study of disease. As Campbell et al (2) suggest, these categories can be compound, defining the state of the organism in terms of two or more sets of categories, such as a morbid anatomical one -pneumonia -and a microbiological one -varicella infection -to give the diagnosis of varicella pneumonia. Sets of categories may be orthogonally related, as in this example, so that definition in terms of one set is independent of the other, a full definition depending on both, as a point on a map is defined by latitude and longitude. They can also be hierarchical, as for example when one defines a pathophysiological state, such as left ventricular failure, and then proceeds to seek for an underlying cause, such as hypertension, myocardial infarction, cardiomyopathy, etc. Though traditionally diseases have been thought of as discrete, box-like categories, there is a growing tendency to think more in terms of continuous dimensions, particularly in diseases with multifactorial aetiology. Medicine is leaving behind the idea, criticised by Kennedy (i) of 'specific diseases caused by specific agents', if indeed it was ever held.
Thus perhaps one can think of obstructive airways disease in terms of three continuous dimensions of emphysema, chronic bronchitis and asthma, with each patient occupying a particular point in the space defined by these dimensions, as on a three dimensional graph, according to how severely he or she is affected by each process. Similarly the 'classical' pictures of polymyalgia rheumatica and temporal arteritis are now seen by some physicians, not as defining boxes into which we must try to fit recalcitrant clinical pictures, but as defining the ends of a dimension on which clinical cases may fall. In choosing useful nosological categories, it is important to bear in mind their purpose, to aid decisions as regards treatment and prognosis. If two conditions do not differ in treatment or prognosis then there is little value in distinguishing them for 'a difference that makes no difference is no difference'. Of course differences which do not appear to be important from these points of view may repay exploration by increasing our understanding, and new knowledge may make it important to divide a category formerly considered homogeneous (as has for example happened to infective hepatitis in recent years). Though naturally most of the categories and dimensions will be diseases in the first sense, since the ultimate purpose in studying them is to seek to treat them, this is not a necessity of the categorisation. There are anatomico-physiological states, such as the Dubin-Johnson syndrome mentioned above, which while statistically abnormal and defined in the same categories as diseases, confer no real disadvantages and therefore in no way merit treatment. This is not a new idea; surgeons and anatomists have long characterised some of the wide variations of the human organism as anomalies rather than diseases. In some cases, hypertension being a good example, a dimension will stretch from full health to life-threatening disease, and the point at which to draw a line distinguishing health from disease is to some extent arbitary and is based on an analysis of the advantages and disadvantages to the organism of medical intervention, again partly an ethical matter.
Clearly the distinctions between the three questions made here are artificial and they are complexly interrelated, and of course in real life are usually considered together. It is, however, important to contrast intellectual judgments (which disease pattern does this case most clearly resemble; which drug is most likely to have a certain effect on a patient?) from ethical or value judgments (would this person be better off if not homosexual; is the cost of this treatment worth it for the benefits it bestows ?). Though the discussion has focussed on the diagnostic stage of a medical consultation, the same distinctions are relevant to treatment decisions, as indicated in the examples above.
Conclusions
In the light of the above discussion, definitions at two levels are offered, one of being diseased and one of a nosological category or dimension. Therefore: i) A nosological category is defined in terms of the anatomico-physiological model by one or more features displayed by organisms within that category. If the variables are continuous rather than discrete, it may often be more valuable to think in terms of a dimension, rather than a set of separate categories.
2) An organism is said to be diseased when it falls into a nosological category, or in a position on a nosological dimension, which places it at a 'disadvantage' in comparison with an organism which differs only in the features of that nosological category or dimension.
If the difference between organisms within and without the nosological category is not such as to place it at a disadvantage, the expression 'variant' or 'anomaly' may be used.
It is important to note that these are functional definitions, and as such are only intended to be ofuse in the limited context of potential or actual medical consultation. They do not attempt to answer wider philosophical questions which may arise outside this context, such as whether or not when a lay person takes an aspirin for a hangover he is treating a disease. Unlike previous formulations, no attempt is made to avoid the value judgments in the categorisation of an organism as diseased, and in the need for medical intervention. It is hoped that by distinguishing the cognitive aspects of categorisation group.bmj.com on October 19, 2017 -Published by http://jme.bmj.com/ Downloaded from from the moral considerations of diseasedness, and offering an empirical approach to the question of the proper scope of medicine, confusion and the justification of moral values on apparently scientific grounds will be avoided.
